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If firms are unable to fully control their emissions, the cap in a permit market may be 
exceeded.  Using stochastic aggregate emissions as the underlying I derive an options pricing 
formula that expresses the permit price as a function of the penalty for noncompliance and the 
probability of a binding cap.  I apply my model to the EU ETS, where rapid market setup made 
it difficult for firms to adjust their production technology in time for phase 1.  The model fits 
the data well, implying that the permit price was driven by firms hedging against stochastic 
emissions rather than marginal abatement costs.   
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1 Introduction 
The centerpiece of emissions permit market theory is that firms equate their marginal 
abatement costs to the permit price at all times.  If a firm finds abatement of an additional unit 
of emissions to be cheaper than the permit price, it will make a profit from abating and either 
buy one fewer or sell one more permit on the market.  Conversely, if purchasing a permit is 
cheaper than abating another unit of emissions, the firm will use the permit market to reach 
compliance.  The efficient outcome of this arbitrage game is that all firms abate to the point 
where their marginal abatement costs equal the permit price, and that the permit market clears.   
However, real-world permit markets may not clear for two reasons:  First, abatement may 
not be feasible for the involved firms in the short run without cutting output.  And second, 
cutting output can be either economically or legally infeasible, for example in the case of 
electricity markets where output has to be matched with supply at all times in order for the grid 
not to crash.  It is thus possible that aggregate emissions are stochastic and turn out to be either 
significantly below or above the cap.  Most permit markets to date impose a penalty for 
noncompliance per unit of emission for which no permit can be surrendered.   
The price path of emission allowances during the first few years of European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has puzzled market participants and economists alike.  A 
series of recent studies analyze the first phase of the market under the implicit assumption of a 
clearing permit market but find little evidence that the permit price was indeed driven by 
marginal abatement costs (Alberola et al., 2008; Bunn and Fezzi, 2008; Mansanet-Bataller et 
al., 2007; Rickels et al., 2007; Paolella and Taschini, 2006).   
I set up a model in which firms are unable to effectively control their emissions and buy 
permits in order to hedge against the possibility of having to pay a penalty.  The permit price 
thus becomes a binary option (a.k.a. “cash or nothing” option) that is a function of the 
probability of a binding cap and the penalty for noncompliance, but not of marginal abatement 
costs.  I estimate the free parameters from the options formula with daily data from the first 
2 phase of the EU ETS and proxy for daily emissions using daily generation of electricity from 
fossil fuels.  The model fits the data well, at least better than abatement-based models. The fit is 
greatly increased if a parameter multiplying the variance of future electricity generation is 
introduced into the model.  My findings imply that allowances in the first phase of the EU ETS 
were driven by firms hedging against stochastic emissions, rather than by marginal abatement 
costs.  This has important efficiency implications, because the equality of marginal abatement 
costs and permit price is a necessary condition to achieve a given emissions cap at least cost, 
which is the explicit goal of every permit market.   
My paper is closest in spirit to (Chesney and Taschini, 2008), who derive an options 
model for emissions permits under the assumption of no abatement.  The main difference 
between our papers is that they simulate an underlying pollution process and based on this 
compute an options price, whereas I take the allowance price and the pollution process as given 
and estimate a set of free parameters using an options pricing formula.   
Section 2 gives some background about permit pricing and the EU ETS.  In Section 3 I 
derive an options pricing formula for EU ETS allowances as a function of emissions, the cap, 
the penalty for noncompliance and a set of free parameters.  This formula contains the mean 
and variance of expected future emissions, which I derive in Section 4 as a function of 
exogenous stochastic processes.  Section 5 presents empirical estimates for these underlying 
processes and the free parameters in the options pricing formula.  Section 6 concludes.   
 
Background 
2.1  Literature  
Historically, permit pricing formulas were derived by solving an optimal control problem, 
originating with Montgomery (1972).  This was later extended to the dynamic case (Leiby and 
3 Rubin, 2001), to incorporate banking and borrowing (Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse, 1996; 
Rubin, 1996) and to address uncertainty (Schennach, 2000; Zhao, 2003; Newell et al., 2005).   
Kosobud et al. (2005) introduced financial tools to the analysis of SO2 permits in the US 
Acid Rain program.  Other contributions that approach permit markets from a financial 
perspective rather than the equalization of marginal abatement costs and permit price include 
Benz and Trueck (2009) and Fehr and Hinz (2006).  Seifert et al (2008) explicitly mention the 
option value of a permit when compared with the alternative of irreversible investment in 
emissions abatement.  Chesney and Taschini (2008) go one step further and define EU ETS 
allowances to be financial (as opposed to “real”) options.  All of these approaches start with the 
definition of underlying pollution processes, and then derive a market-clearing permit price by 
way of simulation.  In contrast, I take the allowance price series in the EU ETS as given and 
test whether it is consistent with an options model.   
 
2.2  The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
The EU ETS is the world’s largest emissions permit market to date and covers the EU’s 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from six industrial sectors (Figure 1), among which power & 
heat
1 is dominant with about 70% of total emissions.  The market is organized into distinct 
multiyear periods called “phases” that are subject to different rules and emission caps.  The first 
phase of spanned the years 2005-2007 and was considered a pilot run for phase II, which 
coincides with the Kyoto compliance period of 2008-2012.  First-phase allowances (one-time 
rights to emit one ton of CO2, denoted as EUA) could not be banked into the second phase and 
lost their value if unused for compliance.
2  About 11,000 individual installations received a 
total of 2.1 billion emission allowances annually, mostly at no cost. For a more detailed 
discussion of the market setup, see Kruger and Pizer (2004)and the PEW White Paper (2005).   
                                                                 
1 Installations identified by activity code 1 in the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL).  Besides power & heat 
producers that sell their output on the market this code also includes numerous installations involved in the production of on-
site power and heat (“autoproducers”).  They account for about 7 % of emissions within activity code 1 (IEA data).   
2 Banking is allowed between the second and later phases.   
4 Firms can trade allowances freely within the EU.  Trades may occur bilaterally, through 
brokers (over-the-counter or OTC trades) or on one of six exchanges.  By April 31, firms have 
to surrender permits corresponding to their emissions in the previous calendar year.  For every 
ton of emitted CO2 for which they don’t surrender an allowance, they have to pay a penalty 
(€40 in Phase I and €100 in Phase II) as well as surrender the missing allowance in the 
following year.  Because firms receive annual allowances in March they can effectively bank 
and borrow across time within a market phase.   
(Figure 1 about here) 
Figure 2 shows allowance price realizations.  The price increased from around €7 in 
January 2005 to above €30 in April 2006, before crashing to below €10 within three days.  It 
then rose again and stabilized above €15 for about four months before decreasing to practically 
zero by mid 2007.  The April price crash was triggered by the first round of emissions 
verifications, which revealed that 2005 emissions were 89 MT below the cap.  Table 1 shows a 
summary of the first market phase.  The second round of emissions verifications in May 2007 
again found an allowance surplus but this had no impact since prices had already decreased to a 
few cents.  Prices in the current phase II are much higher because of a tighter emissions cap and 
a banking provision into later phases.  They are also less volatile, presumably due to improved 
information about aggregate emissions based on the experiences from phase 1.   
(Figure 2 about here) 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
2.3  Assumption of stochastic emissions 
The assumption that firms cannot perfectly control their emissions and that aggregate 
emissions are therefore stochastic is central to my analysis.  I think that this assumption is 
appropriate for electricity producers (by far the largest sector covered by the system) during 
Phase I of the EU ETS for the following reasons:  
5 Because a sufficiently large imbalance of demand and supply crashes the electricity grid 
leads to large costs from blackouts, many electricity providers are required by law to maintain 
the grid voltage within a narrow band.  The stochastic nature of consumer demand therefore 
directly translates into stochastic electricity supply.   
Given that output is stochastic, emissions are stochastic unless abatement is feasible.  
There are two possible ways to cut emissions from power production:  Building more efficient 
generators or shifting production from more polluting to less polluting generators within the 
existing generation portfolio.
3  The timely construction of cleaner production technology was 
largely impossible before the end of the first phase, and borrowing from later phases was not 
allowed.  This leaves essentially only fuel switching as a method of abatement in the power 
sector (Sijm et al., 2006; Bunn and Fezzi, 2008; Rickels et al., 2007; Mansanet-Bataller et al., 
2007; Alberola et al., 2008).  However, energy-intensive industries are typically locked into 
long-term contracts.  It is questionable whether firms were able to adjust these contracts in 
time, and/or whether they were willing to do so, considering the volatility of allowance prices.   
Furthermore, even if abatement by fuel switching had been technically feasible, many 
firms anticipated that their first-phase emissions were going to be used to guide the distribution 
of second-phase allowances.  The European Commission urged member countries not to 
engage in this sort of allocation “updating”, but to little avail:  Most of them based their 
national allocation plans for Phase II on verified 2005 emissions.
4  Basing future allocation on 
current emissions creates a disincentive to abate, because every unit of abatement comes at a 
cost not only in the current period but also causes a reduction in future free allocation 
(Boehringer and Lange, 2005).  As a result, it is possible that firms stuck to their existing fuel 
contracts even if they had been able to switch to gas and thus reduce their future free allocation.   
                                                                 
3 Note that carbon capture and storage (CSS) was not an option given the existing infrastructure and the time frame.   
4 One possible reason for this economically highly inefficient choice is the scarcity of information about historic emissions in 
the EU, which made it politically difficult for the EU member countries to disregard the information gained from the first round 
of emissions verification.   
6 Lastly, from an empirical perspective, it does not matter whether firms were unable to 
reduce emissions, or the allowance price simply never reached marginal abatement costs (the 
cost of fuel switching was far above the allowance price during most of the first phase).  In both 
cases firms would aim to reach compliance exclusively on the permit market while treating 
emission as a function of stochastic demand.   
 
Options Formula 
Let   be the closing price for an allowance on day t, with the index   
starting on January 1, 2005 and ending on December 31, 2007.  CO2 emissions on day t are 
represented by  .  Let   denote cumulative realized emissions and 
 cumulative future emissions until the end of the market.  Past emissions   



















P  be the penalty for 
noncompliance and   the total emissions cap over the entire market period imposed by the 
regulator.  Finally, it will be useful to define   to be the “remaining cap” until the 
end of the market.   
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The purchase of an allowance gives the bearer the option to use it for compliance at the 
end of the period or to sell it.  However, if the cap turns out to be not binding, the bearer can 
retire the allowance.  This makes an allowance a financial option, specifically a binary call 
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The penalty P  is the sum €40 and the cost of buying an additional permit for the second 
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At t , it is not known with certainty whether the cap will be exceeded, provided that it 
has not been exceeded already.  The expected payoff from holding an allowance at time T  is  
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where   denotes the probability density function over cumulative future CO2 emissions 
and   stands for the expectation taken using all information available at time t.  Naturally, if 
the cap is already exceeded at time t  such that 
) (
T
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T  0 t S  , the probability that the allowance 
price is equal to the penalty is one.   
I specify emissions as a linear combination of normally distributed processes (see Section 
4), which means that they are normally distributed as well.  Options pricing formulae are 
usually based on log-normally distributed underlying assets, reflecting the idea that total returns 
are the multiplication of single-period returns.  Cumulative emissions, however, are additive 
rather than multiplicative, and it is therefore appropriate to model them using a normal 
distribution.
5  Let  t   and   denote the mean and standard deviation of stochastic cumulative 

















has a standard normal distribution by construction.  Let  ) (   and  ) (   be the probability 
density function (pdf) and cumulative probability density function (cdf) of the standard normal 
distribution, respectively.  I now convert the integral in (3) into an integral over   :  t Q
                                                                 
5 In theory, the choice of a normal distribution makes a truncation at zero necessary since negative emissions are not defined.  
But because CO2 emissions in the EU are many standard deviations away from zero, the correction implied by the truncation is 
very small, such that for the remainder of this paper I will neglect the truncation issue.   
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which is equivalent to  











Arbitrage considerations dictate that the price at time t be equal to the expected price at T, 
discounted by the risk-free rate of interest r.
6  This means that the allowance price is a 
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where the term in parenthesis is the discounted penalty and the last term is the probability that 
the cap is exceeded (this last term is unity for the second line).  The forward price for phase-2-
allowances is already discounted, such that the application of the discount rate r only applies to 
the cash penalty of € 40.  Equation (6) is a binary options formula for the allowance price, with 
the underlying being normally distributed cumulative future emissions.   
What remains to be determined in order to evaluate (6) are past emissions and the mean 
and standard deviation of cumulative future emissions.  The latter are not directly observed, but 
have to be derived from underlying processes and ultimately estimated using market data.  This 
is the subject of the following section.   
 
                                                                 
6 Real-world markets are typically not risk-neutral, but option prices based on risk neutrality nevertheless yield the correct 
(meaning no-arbitrage) solution for traded assets Hull, J. C., 2002. Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives, Ch. 11,. Prentice 
Hall,, Upper Saddle River, NJ. .  Although risk aversion may be particularly important for the pricing of non-traded assets such 
as the weather or electricity demand, the price of market risk can never be determined with a sufficient degree of confidence in 
order to make its inclusion in a pricing formula worthwhile, due to measurement and identification issues (e.g. a greater market 
fundamental and a higher price of risk have the same effect on the price).   
9 Deriving the mean and standard deviation of future emissions 
4.1.  CO2 emissions as a function of exogenous stochastic processes 
There exist no data about daily CO2 emissions, but for the power and heat sector there is 
something that can serve as a substitute: Daily electricity consumption.   
Electricity is special in the sense that demand has to be met with a matching supply at all 
times in order for the grid not to collapse.  I assume that the short-term price elasticity of 
electricity consumption is zero, such that electricity supply is equal to demand, which in turn is 
a function of exogenous processes such as the weather and overall economic activity.
7   
Because only generation from fossil fuels contributes to CO2 emissions, I have to adjust 
total consumption by the availability of “clean” (i.e. non-CO2-emitting) sources of electricity, 
mainly hydroelectric and nuclear power.
8  Hydroelectric generation depends on rainfall and 
varies within and between years, but nuclear generation is largely constant due to low marginal 
but prohibitively high start-up costs.   
Let ct represent overall electricity consumption; ct
c consumption of conventional fossil-
fueled generation; n nuclear power generation (all in Giga-Watt-hours (GWh) per day); and ht 
rainfall in the EU in millimeters (mm) per day.  Demand for conventional generation is  
(7)   
c
tt t cc h    n
where  is a fixed coefficient translating precipitation into hydroelectric power.
9  I compute  
by dividing the EU’s total hydro generation in 1990-2005 of 4,852,339 GWh by cumulative 
                                                                 
7 In the long run, consumers will react to higher electricity prices by changing their consumption habits and appliance portfolio, 
such that electricity demand is also a function of the electricity price.  But regardless of the time horizon and the associated 
energy efficiency of households and industry, exogenous shocks will always drive short-term electricity consumption.   
8 Although wind generation has increased rapidly during the past few years, it still accounts for a relatively small fraction of 
total power production.   
9 Since precipitation can be stored to some extent, either in reservoirs or as snow in the mountains, there is no immediate 
relationship between precipitation and hydro generation on any given day.  On the long run, however, all (net) hydro generation 
is ultimately due to precipitation, and even though rainfall today may not translate into more generation today, it nevertheless 
reduces expected conventional generation needed to satisfy consumer electricity demand until the end of the market.   
10 weighted precipitation over the same period of 9,775.28 mm, using installed hydroelectric 
capacity per country as weights.  This results in a conversion factor of =496.389 GWh/mm.   
In the EU, 12 member countries have nuclear power plants (BE, CZ, DE, ES, FI, FR, HU, 
NL, SK, SL, SW, UK).  Their average total output in the years 2003-2005 was 2,679 GWh per 
day, which I will use as a measure for  .    n
The emission intensity (in CO2/GWh) of the marginal generator varies over the dispatch 
order (the sequence according to which generators come online, usually based on least cost).  
The theoretically correct way to express emissions in Europe’s power & heat sector is  
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where   is a function transforming conventional thermal power generation into CO2 
emissions.  To compute the integral in (8) I would need to know the dispatch order for each 
day, as well as the marginal emission intensity of all generators involved, information which is 
not readily available.  Instead, I approximate the emission intensity of all generators that are not 


















The parameter   is the average emission intensity of fossil-fueled electricity generation 
beyond minimum generation.  For the period under consideration (i.e. the first phase of the EU 
ETS) I treat   as fixed.   
The adjustment parameter   is the difference between CO2 emissions associated with 
minimum thermal generation   and the (theoretical) emissions if the emission intensity 
K
min g   
11 were applicable to inframarginal generation as well.
10   Combining (7) and (9), emissions are a 
function of a set of parameters and the two stochastic exogenous processes   and  :    t c t h
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At time t, the mean of future CO2 emissions is defined by  
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Both expressions are functions of the constants  and  , the parameters   and  n K , and the 
mean, variance and covariance of electricity consumption and precipitation, the derivation of 
which is the subject of the next subsection.   
 
4.2.  Properties of the stochastic processes ct and ht  
For the definition of the stochastic processes of electricity demand and precipitation, I 
will draw extensively from a paper by Peter Alaton, Boualem Djehiche and David Stillberger 
(2002).  Although their analysis focuses on pricing a weather option over heating-degree days 
                                                                 
10 In principle, the average emission intensity of inframarginal generation could be greater or smaller than the emission 
intensity of marginal generation. For example, if inframarginal generation consists to a large part of lignite or anthracite coal 
power plants, then K>0 because these generators have a greater emission intensity than the marginal generators which are 
predominantly coal and gas generators.  On the other hand, if inframarginal generation consists mainly of generators such as 
combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs), then K<0.  In the EU, K>0 is more likely given the large number of lignite plants in 
Germany and the new EU member countries from Eastern Europe.   
12 with the underlying process being temperature, it is very similar in principle to both electricity 
demand and precipitation, as both are exogenously driven stochastic processes that contain 
deterministic annual fluctuation and long-term trends.  The contribution of my paper is not the 
derivation of the property of such processes, but the application of these methods to CO2 
allowance pricing.   
I will model both electricity consumption and precipitation as diffusion processes
11 
consisting of a deterministic mean and a stochastic part, and which exhibit mean-reversion.
12  
For mathematical tractability, I include the stochastic element in the form of a generalized 
Wiener process.   Combining the processes in the index x, they can be described as 
(13)  *( ) [ ( )] ; ,
m
mx t
tx t t x t
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This is known as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with a non-zero mean 
m
t x  and time-
varying volatility (for a general treatment see e.g. Bibby and Sorensen (1995)).  The term in 
brackets represents the drift, followed by the diffusion term defined by the standard Wiener 
process   multiplied by the volatility. The first element of the drift term is due to the fact 




ax measure the speed at which the processes revert back to their long-term mean.   
I constrain the volatility to be constant within each calendar month, but allow it to differ 
across months.  The index   labels the month to which the time index t refers.  I will start this 
index at 1 in January 1976 and finish at 384 in December 2007.  Thus,  
i
                                                                 
11 A diffusion process is the solution to a stochastic differential equation. In particular, it is a continuous-time Markov-process 
with a continuous sample path.  This is a realistic description for electricity consumption and precipitation even though the 
market and weather data are naturally only available for discrete points in time.   
12 Mean reversion is a commonly observed characteristic in many naturally occurring processes, as they generally do not grow 
without bounds and eventually return to their long-term mean.   
13    
( ) 1 Jan 1976
2 Feb 1976
384 Dec 2007







Because I assume that the volatility is the same for each calendar month regardless of the 
year, it follows that  ] 12 * [ ] [ k i i     for any integer k .   
I define the long-term mean of electricity consumption and precipitation as  
(14)   
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1  h c x ,  ) describe the level and trend of the two process, 
respectively, whereas   describes the amplitudes of the respective sine wave.  The phase 
angles   shift the oscillation of the two processes to their correct position.  Lastly, the vector 
of coefficients   (not applicable to rainfall) accounts for differences in electricity 
consumption across different weekdays, with   being a vector of weekday dummies.  
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The first term on the RHS is the deviation of actual consumption/precipitation at the 
present time s from its mean.  As time goes on, the impact of this deviation will diminish due to 
the mean-reversion property of both processes, measured by the exponent.  If one of the 
processes is at its average at time s, or if  , then the first term will drop out, and the 




The mean and variance of electricity demand and precipitation can be computed as 
(16) 
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The second equality follows from the fact that 
2 [( ) ]
x
t E dW dt  .  If the volatility does not 
change between s and time t, (17) can be solved to  
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If s and t do not fall within the same month, the expression becomes more complicated.  I 
will denote the first day of each month as    i t i t t i t   ) ( : min )] ( [
min .  In the Appendix (Result 
2) I show that for   and  , the general expression for the variance is   h c x ,  ) ( ) ( t i s i 
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If the volatility is the same for each month, (19) collapses to (18).  To calculate the 
covariance between electricity consumption and rainfall on the same day, note that 
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Analogous to the procedure used for the variance, this can be solved to  
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15 Lastly, the covariance between electricity consumption/precipitation on day t and u for 
 is defined by (see Appendix, Result 3):   s t  u
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I now substitute expressions (16) and (19)-(21) into (11) and (12), which in turn I 
substitute into (6).  The empirical estimation of the parameters   and 
ch
x
c x x x x a D      , , , , , , 2 1 0
) (i x   is the subject of the following section.   
 
Estimation 
I evaluate (6) for the period between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2007, because 
daily electricity data is not available for most countries before that.  To estimate  t   and   I 
use data through 2005 only, with some exceptions where necessary and as detailed below.   
t s
5.1.) Data 
Allowance prices:  Over-the-counter (OTC) closing allowance prices from Point Carbon.   
Electricity consumption:  Daily data about electricity consumption is available from the Union 
for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE)
13 for continental European 
countries, including all EU member states except for the Nordic countries,
14 the UK, Ireland, 
the Baltic States, Malta and Cyprus.  Electricity consumption on the third Wednesday of each 
month
15 is available since 1994 for 9 EU countries, since 1996 for Germany and since 1999 for 
another 5 countries.  Consumption on the weekend following the third Wednesday of each 
month is available for the year 2000 only.  Starting in 2006, electricity consumption is available 
                                                                 
13 Available at www.ucte.org, last accessed in September 2008.   
14 Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Norway is not part of the EU, and although it is now linked to the EU ETS, this was not the 
case during the first phase of the market.   
15 Wednesdays are supposed to be the most typical weekdays (as opposed to Mondays and Fridays, which may be slightly 
different), and the third week is supposed to be the typical week of a month.   
16 on a daily basis for all UCTE countries.  To supplement the UCTE data I obtained historic 
electricity consumption data from the transmission system operators (TSOs) in the UK, Ireland 
and the Nordic countries.
16  I exclude Malta, Cyprus and the Baltic States due to lack of data.  
The 20 countries included in the analysis account for 99% of total production in the EU-25.  
The EU produces nearly all of the electricity it consumes, with net imports/exports accounting 
for less than 0.1 percent of overall consumption.  I therefore exclude imports/exports in my 
calculations and set EU consumption equal to EU generation.  In order to accommodate the 
variation in type and provenance of the data I will carry out the analyses separately for each 
group of countries for which the available data is of the same type (e.g. daily vs. monthly) and 
covers the same time period.  The six groups are listed in Table 2.  Figures 3a-f show the 
available pre-2006 electricity consumption data by group.   
(Table 2 about here) 
(Figure 3 about here) 
Precipitation:  Data from the European Climate Assessment and Dataset,
17 which contains daily 
entries for 1,048 monitoring stations located in 42 countries.  The period of observation varies 
from a few years to >150 years, with most series spanning several decades.  To model the 
stochastic process underlying precipitation, I use data covering the years 1976-2005.  The 
conversion of precipitation into hydroelectric power is location-specific.  For example, rainfall 
in the Netherlands or in Denmark is largely irrelevant because these countries have very little 
installed hydroelectric generation capacity, whereas hydro generation constitutes a large share 
of total power production in Alpine and Scandinavian countries.  I average station entries by 
                                                                 
16 UK: Daily data since 2001 from the National grid, available at http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/Data/;  Ireland: 
Daily data since 2002 from Eirgrid, available at http://www.eirgrid.com; Denmark: Daily data since 2000 from Energinet, 
available at http://www.energinet.dk; Finland: Daily data since 2004 from Fingrid, available at http://www.fingrid.fi; Sweden: 
Daily data since 2000 from Svenska Kraftnät, available at http://www.svk.se/web/Page.aspx?id=5794.    
17 Klein Tank et al. (2007): “Daily Dataset of 20
th-Century Surface Air Temperature and Precipitation Series for the European 
Climate Assessment”, available at eca.knmi.nl, last accessed in September 2008.   
17 country,
18 and then create a weighted European average using installed hydroelectric capacity 
in 2006 as weights.
19  Installed hydro generation is given in the last column of Table 2.  
Weighted precipitation in millimeters (mm) is shown in Figure 4 for a subset of the sample 
period.  Whereas it is difficult to visually discern a pattern in the raw data (Fig. 4a), using 
moving 7-day-average (Fig. 4b) reveals a clear seasonality.   
(Figure 4 about here) 
5.2  Parameter estimation for electricity consumption and precipitation 
I estimate the parameters   and 
x x x x x D , , , , 2 1 0     ] [i x   in (14) with a model that features 
an autoregressive error to account for mean-reversion and multiplicative heteroskedasticity to 
allow the variance to differ across months:  
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The index x covers six different electricity consumption series, plus the (weighted) 
precipitation series, all of which are estimated separately by maximum likelihood.  The 
parameters   and   are the same as in (14) and are estimated directly.  The 
transformation of the sine wave plus the phase angle into a sine and cosine wave is a standard 
trigonometric relation and serves to linearize the equation.  The parameters   and   can be 














                                                                 
18 For low-lying countries such as Belgium and Luxembourg, I simply take an average of all monitoring stations.  However, 
since hydro generation in the Alps and in Scandinavia is highly location-specific, I take an average of the subset of monitoring 
stations that are located in or near mountains.  A full list of the selected stations is available from the author upon request.   
19 This data comes from UCTE (www.ucte.org) for continental Europe; from Nordpool (www.nordel.org) for Scandinavia; 
from the Austrian Energy Agency (www.energyagency.at/enercee/) for the Baltic States; from Harrison Harrison, G. P., 2005. 
Prospects for Hydro in the UK: Between a ROC and a Hard Place?  Working paper. University of Edinburgh. for the UK; and 
from the Electricity Supply Board (ESB, available at http://www.esb.ie/main/about_esb/power_stations_intro.jsp) for Ireland; 
all accessed in September 2008.   
20 See, for example, Beckwith et al. Beckwith, T. G., Marangoni, R. D.,Lienhard, J. H. V., 1995. Mechanical Measurements. 
Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts. , p. 131.  The t-statistics and confidence intervals have to be computed using the 
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I estimate the daily variance   from the autocorrelation parameters   and the 
variance of the white noise  .
] [
2 i x 
x 
] [
2 i x 














   
 
The mean-reversion parameter   measures the speed at which a shock to   is felt at 
later times.  From (16), the expectation of future electricity consumption or precipitation is  
x a t x
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This makes it clear that the term   is equivalent to the impulse-response function of 
the AR(1) process defined by 




   (see e.g. Hamilton (1994) p. 53-54), which 
measures the impact of an exogenous shock occurring in period s on the variable in period t.  
Equating the two and solving yields  
(25)  ln( ) x x a    
All parameter estimates are given in Table 3.  I compute the correlation coefficients 
among the different series  ,  , by using the data from 2006-2007, for which 
all series have daily entries.
kl 
11 , , ,..., kl c c h 
22  The results in Table 4 show that electricity consumption across 
                                                                 
21 Because I cannot estimate an AR(1) parameter with data that only contains entries for every 3
rd Wednesday per month, I use 
the 2006-7 data to estimate this parameter for Series 1-3.  Likewise, the estimate of the variance is sensitive to the frequency of 
measurement Hayashi, T.,Yoshida, N., 2005. On covariance estimation of non-synchronously observed diffusion processes. 
Bernoulli 11, 359-379. and generally improves with greater frequency.  I therefore also use the 2006-7 data to estimate the 
variance and the correlation coefficients (see below).  For all other parameters, I use pre-2006 data only.  Note that the daily 
variance and mean reversion parameter for Series 4-6 (for which such a comparison can be made) are not significantly different 
between pre- and post-2006 data.   
22 Hayashi and Yoshida Ibid. developed an unbiased estimator to compute the correlation coefficient between time series of 
different measuring intervals, but that estimator is not bounded by unity in magnitude, relying on truncation instead.  Also, this 
would only address the problem of differing frequencies within the same time period, but not that of different time periods.   
19 the six different regions is highly correlated, but that precipitation and electricity consumption 
are not.  I will therefore set  [,]0
j
st t Cov c h j  
[]
.   
(Table 3 about here) 
(Table 4 about here) 
I derived the expressions for the variance and covariance in (16), (19) and (21) using 
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5.3  Parameter estimation in the options formula 
I use the obtained results to estimate the options pricing formula.  Because emissions 
were below the total cap at the end of the market as well as for each year individually, I will 
disregard the second line of equation (6).   
The mean and standard deviation of future emissions are a function of free parameters 
and estimates of the mean, variance and covariance of the processes for electricity consumption 
and precipitation.  Substituting (11) and (12) into (6) and simplifying gives  
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
Using the much higher-frequency data for 2006-2007 is equivalent to assuming that the covariance between electricity 
consumption in the six different regions and EU-wide weighted precipitation is the same before and after January 1, 2006.  For 
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Before proceeding to estimation I have to make two adjustments to (26):  First, because 
my data only covers 2006-2007 emissions from the power and heat sector, I include a 
parameter V  representing 2005 emissions as well as emissions from all other sectors.  Firms 
have expectations about this parameter, but it is evident from the April 2006 price crash that 
these expectations were updated after the first round of emissions verifications.  As a second 
adjustment I therefore include an adjustment factor V
EV multiplied by a dummy variable Dt
EV 
taking the value of zero before, and of one after the first round of emissions verifications.
23  


























The price crash in April 2006 implies that V  has to be negative, consistent with firms 
updating their expectation of the total number of remaining available permits upwards.  The 
combined parameter 
EV
K  represents the number of allowances available to firms in the power 
sector in the years 2006-7, taking into account the difference between inframarginal and 
marginal emission intensity.  The factor  2
3  that multiplies the correction factor for 
inframarginal generation stems from the fact that V  already contains total emissions for 2005 
including this correction.  I use an interest rate r of 10% per annum (using 0 and 20% did not 
                                                                 
23 Because there was no sudden price move in either direction after the second round of emissions verifications, I did not 
introduce a dummy for this event.  Likewise, the third round of emissions verifications in May 2008 had no impact on the 
allowance price.   
21 significantly alter the results) and estimate eq. (27) by nonlinear regression under the 
assumption that the residuals  t   are independently and normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance 
2
  .   
In (27), expectations about emissions from other sectors and updating of these expectations 
after the first round of emission verifications only has an impact on emission levels (through 
the parameters V  and V ), but not on uncertainty.  As an extension I will allow the standard 
deviation of total future emissions to be different from my estimate 
EV
t B  for the power sector.  
Because the uncertainty decreases over time, it makes sense to model this as a multiplicative 
rather than additive parameter.  Lastly, because the first round of emissions verifications may 
have significantly reduced firms’ uncertainty about future aggregate emissions from all sectors, 
I allow firms’ estimate of the emission uncertainty to be updated after the crash:  
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Setting  1    and   reduces (28) to (27).   
EV  0 
The parameters K ,  t   and   are not individually identified, such that I compute 
estimates for V and 
EV V
EV
t   given K .  For this I choose a sensible range for K  based on the 
following calculation:   
The total cap   is about 6,300 Mt (million tons) CO2, or roughly 2,100 Mt per year 




about 1,175 Mt per year, leaving 925 Mt for all other industrial emitters in the years 2006-7 
(IEA data).  If firms’ expectations approximately reflect these numbers, then 
.  To get a ballpark number for TK  I assume that lignite  2,100 Mt 2* 3,950 Mt V  
                                                                 
24 These are generators that sell all their output on the market.  I assume that combined power and heat (CPH) producers 
optimize their power output and treat heat production as a byproduct.  This is of course different for pure heat producers, which 
I exclude from the analysis and the emissions of which are part of the parameter V.    
22 plants run continuously and are never at the margin, whereas marginal generation consists of a 
mix of gas and hard coal generation.  The emission intensity of lignite is about 225 tCO2/GWh 
greater than that of the average remaining fossil fuel generation in Europe, and electric output 
from lignite is about 290,000 GWh per year (IEA data).  This means that 
2
3 225 t/GWh*290,000 GWh*2 130.5 Mt TK  , and that  2,220 Mt K  .  I use a range of 
1,800 Mt 2,600 Mt K   to account for the uncertainty embedded in this calculation.   
The left panel in Table 5 shows the results from estimating (27) for different values of K .  
The amount of “additional” available permits   is 81-116 Mt.  This range makes sense in the 
context of a market that was initially viewed to be tight but then revealed to have an allowance 
surplus of 89 Mt.  The range of the emission intensity 
EV V
  of 607-876 tCO2/GWh is also 
plausible, considering that the emission intensity of gas and coal generators is about 420 and 
960 t CO2/GWh, respectively, and that coal generators are in the majority in Europe.  All 
estimates are statistically significant at p<0.001.   
As a measure of model fit I employ the Cox-Snell generalized R
2, defined by 
, where 
2 1[( 0 ) /() ]
n RL L  
2 / () L   and   refer to the likelihood of the full model and of a 
model that contains only a constant and an emission verification dummy, and n is the number 
of observations.  The generalized R
2 has an intuitive interpretation: It measures the percentage 
of the variation of the dependent variable that is unexplained by the null model (Nagelkerke, 
1991).  The resulting R
2 therefore implies that model (27) accounts for 81 % of the allowance 
price variation that is unexplained by a model that only relies on pre- and post-crash intercepts.   
(0) L
The right panel of Table 5 contains the estimates from specification (28) where I allow 
firms’ estimate of the standard deviation of future generation to differ from my estimate of  t B , 
and to be updated after the first round of emissions verifications.  The parameter estimate of 
1.17    implies that the pre-crash uncertainty of future emissions was 17% greater than the 
uncertainty that I computed using electricity generation alone.  The value of    0.89
EV  
23 shows that beliefs about uncertainty were adjusted downwards after the first round of emissions 
verification, leading to an overall uncertainty estimate that is only 28% of  t B .  The regression 
fit as measured by the generalized R squared increases to 95%.   
Whereas the range of the implied emission intensity remains largely the same as in the 
base specification, the “surprise” number of additionally available permits   is now far 
above -89 Mt for all values of 
EV V
K , although still negative.  This is consistent with a high pre-
crash price if firms expected emissions in 2006-7 to be significantly greater than in 2005 such 
that the cap would be exceeded even with a modest allowance surplus in the first year.  An 
alternative explanation for the modest values of   is that the action in model (28) lies in the 
uncertainty rather than levels:  Updating beliefs about the number of available permits upwards 
has the same effect on price as revising the uncertainty of future emission downwards 
(assuming that the system is on track for a nonbinding cap):  Both imply that the likelihood that 
the cap turns out to be binding is decreased, which leads to a crash in the allowance price.   
EV V
(Table 5 about here) 
Figure 5 shows the predicted price series computed using the estimates from the two 
specifications, along with the actual allowance price.  Both models do a reasonable job in 
tracking the allowance price, although the more flexible second specification follows the EUA 
much closer.  Importantly, both models are able to explain a stabilization of the EUA price at a 
level significantly above zero after the price crash.  This is because although the cap was seen 
to be generous after the first round of emissions verifications, there remained a nonzero 
probability of higher-than-expected emissions in the future making the cap binding and the 
penalty of noncompliance apply.  In contrast, models that are based on the equality of permit 
price and marginal abatement costs would predict a price of zero once the emission were 
revealed to be below the cap for the first year.   
(Figure 5 about here) 
24 The much better model fit of the specification that allows for an update in the uncertainty 
implies that in the context of stochastic emissions, uncertainty is relatively more important than 
knowledge about levels in determining the price.  This is a common feature in options prices, 
which depend heavily on uncertainty about the underlying.   
 
Conclusions 
In this paper I derive an allowance pricing formula based on the assumption that firms 
were not able to effectively control their emissions.  In this case, emissions are stochastic from 
the point of view of the firms, and the value of an allowance is characterized by a binary 
options pricing formula defined by the penalty of noncompliance multiplied by the probability 
of a binding cap, rather than by marginal abatement costs.   
The parameter estimates of the options pricing formula are highly significant and make 
economic sense, confirming the validity of the model.  The predicted allowance price series fits 
the observed prices well, especially when accounting for uncertainty embedded in emissions 
from other sectors and allowing firms’ expectation of uncertainty to be updated after the first 
round of emissions verifications.  The results imply that uncertainty about future emissions are 
relatively more important in setting the allowance price than knowledge about emission levels.   
Importantly, the model is able to explain the price stabilization after the price crash, 
followed by a long and steady decline towards zero, which is due to a declining (but nonzero) 
probability that the cap was going to be binding.  Models based on the equality of allowance 
price and marginal abatement costs would only be able to explain such a movement if marginal 
abatement costs also expressed a steady decline towards the end of the market, which was 
almost certainly not the case: Once the market was shown to be over-allocated, total abatement 
as well as marginal abatement would drop to zero.  This may be the reason for the overall poor 
performance of such models in explaining price drivers in the EU ETS.   
25 My results imply that the allowance price during the first phase of the EU ETS was to a 
large extent driven by firms hedging against the possibility of having to pay a penalty for 
noncompliance, rather than by marginal abatement costs.  In the context of stochastic emissions 
and no borrowing, a permit market does not make sense as it is based on the ability of firms to 
equate marginal abatement costs to permit price and thus control their emissions.  It is precisely 
this reason that makes my assumption about stochasticity of future emissions crucial for my 
paper.  However, even if this assumption is not true, my results can be viewed as a benchmark 
for the extreme case of no control over emissions.  If firms are partially able to control their 
emissions, the price will still exhibit some options features but at the same time incorporate 
drivers related to marginal abatement costs.   
My results imply that the primary goal of the EU ETS and every other permit market, 
namely to achieve a given emissions cap at least cost, was not reached during the first phase, 
and that other instruments such as efficiency improvements on the consumer side (possibly 
funded by an emissions tax) may have been preferable.  However, another goal of the first 
phase that was probably even more important than that of efficiency was to prepare the market 
for the Kyoto period, and this seems to have been a success as the EUA price exhibits much 
less volatility in the current market phase.  Naturally, on the long run marginal abatement costs 
will have to drive prices in the EU ETS, and they may already do so in the current phase that 
allows for borrowing within a 5-year period and indefinite banking.   
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Summary of Phase I of the EU ETS (Mt=million tons) 
    2005 2006 2007 Total  Phase  I 
      
Price (time average)  € 18.40  € 18.05  € 0.72  € 12.39 
Trading volume
a  262 Mt  817 Mt  1,364 Mt  2,443 Mt 
Allocation 2,099  Mt  2,072  Mt 2,079  Mt 6,250  Mt 
Emissions 2,010  Mt  2,031  Mt 2,041  Mt 6,081  Mt 
Surplus (volume)  89 Mt  41 Mt  39 Mt  168 Mt 
Surplus (%)  4.22 %  1.98 %  1.85 %  2.69 % 
  a: OTC and exchange trading for Phase I and II, but excluding bilateral trades 
 
 
Table 2: Data availability (pre-2006) and installed hydroelectric capacity by country 
Country per  Start of data series  Hydro capacity 
data series  Type  Year  Source
a  in 2006 (MW) 
Series 1         
   Austria  3rd Wed.  1994  UCTE  11,811 
   Belgium  3rd Wed.  1994  UCTE  1,411 
   France  3rd Wed.  1994  UCTE  25,457 
   Greece  3rd Wed.  1994  UCTE  3,133 
   Italy  3rd Wed.  1994  UCTE  21,070 
   Luxembourg  3rd Wed.  1994  UCTE  1,128 
   Netherlands  3rd Wed.  1994  UCTE  37 
   Portugal  3rd Wed.  1994  UCTE  4,948 
   Spain  3rd Wed.  1994  UCTE  20,714 
Series 2         
   Germany  3rd Wed.  1996  UCTE  9,100 
Series 3         
   Czech Republic  3rd Wed.  1999  UCTE  2,175 
   Hungary  3rd Wed.  1999  UCTE  46 
   Poland  3rd Wed.  1999  UCTE  2,324 
   Slovak Republic  3rd Wed.  1999  UCTE  2,429 
   Slovenia  3rd Wed.  1999  UCTE  873 
Series 4         
   UK  daily  2002  Country TSO  4,256 
   Ireland  Daily  2002  Country TSO  512 
Series 5         
   Sweden  daily  2001  Country TSO  16,180 
   Denmark  daily  2000  Country TSO  10 
Series 6         
   Finland  daily  2004  Country TSO  3,044 
a: UCTE: Union for the Coordination of transmission of electricity; TSO: Transmission system operator 
29  
Table 3: Parameter estimates for diffusion processes 
    c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 h 
        
N  168 144 108 1,460  2,190  730 10,950 
Const. 1486.06  1248.56  654.25 763.47 569.68 207.54 23.45 
      z  22.73 36.44 17.47 16.92 25.12 1.95  44.10 
Trend 86.98 5.33  4.84  9.06 -2.07  1.20 -0.01 
      z  32.44  3.92 3.42 5.57 -2.44  0.33 -0.28 
Mo n/a n/a n/a -20.84  -3.51  0.66  n/a 
   z  n/a  n/a  n/a  -22.31  -5.98  1.60  n/a 
Fr  n/a n/a n/a -20.31  -13.98  1.01  n/a 
   z  n/a  n/a  n/a  -20.31  -22.31  2.31  n/a 
Sa  -416.47 -207.72 -72.13  -128.22 -67.15  -15.71  n/a 
   z  32.44  3.92  3.42  -101.66  -97.18  -28.56  n/a 
Su  -750.21 -328.49 -128.43 -157.64 -72.43  -21.45  n/a 
      z  -13.80 -26.70 -12.23 -133.32  -103.87  -43.08 n/a 
XNY  n/a n/a n/a -86.72  -37.25  -11.54  n/a 
   z  n/a  n/a  n/a  -20.08  -12.89  -4.85  n/a 
b2(sine) 375.85  145.36  116.96 134.10 104.99 36.98  3.00 
      z  18.99 25.19 32.22 35.09 41.12 10.91 7.06 
w(phase) 1.33  1.39  1.41  1.23 1.34 1.35 -0.40 
      z  42.06 49.94 46.71 38.54 47.09 14.26 -2.96 
           
AR(1)*  0.58 0.39 0.59 0.84 0.86 0.91 0.52 
      z  18.95 11.32 21.52 95.98 87.02 74.92 103.92 
a*  0.54 0.94 0.53 0.18 0.15 0.09 0.65 
      z  10.24 10.68 11.38 17.15 13.20 6.94  68.02 
        
* () i          
Jan 499.71  133.17  88.72  65.21 46.42 23.69 17.21 
Feb 316.67  94.92  53.10  45.35 42.27 23.84 16.15 
Mar 366.30  119.39  64.96  67.47 41.32 21.19 19.15 
Apr 453.41  142.96  79.08  79.32 51.52 31.36 14.49 
May 400.48  135.97  55.56  92.75 48.67 33.66 16.28 
Jun 387.02  132.80  59.94  45.64 46.51 34.84 16.54 
Jul  427.82  116.79  55.50 20.17 30.71 12.12 18.07 
Aug  305.51  97.78 50.71 69.65 12.10 7.77  20.91 
Sep 389.43  122.02  61.45  23.50 18.56 7.65  20.21 
Oct 387.15  120.30  64.95  31.66 27.65 11.17 22.63 
Nov 432.38  108.56  73.35  39.00 35.50 19.57 21.50 
Dec  414.69  163.85  85.40 96.82 55.91 42.84 17.68 
*For series 1-3, based on 2006-7 data; all other estimates based on pre-2006 data 
 
30 Table 4: Correlation coefficients
a among different series 
    c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 h 
c1  1.000        
c2  0.8814*  1.000       
c3  0.9016* 0.8730* 1.000         
c4  0.4554* 0.2976* 0.4927* 1.000       
c5  0.5170* 0.3897* 0.6032* 0.9231* 1.000     
c6  0.4588* 0.3672* 0.5573* 0.8496* 0.9418* 1.000   
h  -0.067 0.014  -0.036 -0.038 -0.033 -0.020 1.000 
*p<0.05; all coefficients based on 2006-7 data       
a: The correlation coefficient between series  xt
i and  xt
j and the corresponding p-value are computed as 
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Table 5: Parameter estimates from estimating (27) and (28); N=513 
   Model 1    Model 2 
Cox-Snell Rsq  0.8140    0.9450 
K      EV V        EV V     
EV   
EV     
(Mt) (tCO2/GWh) (Mt)    (tCO2/GWh) (Mt)       
              
1'800 606.6  -80.6    606.0  -7.8  1.17  -0.89  0.28 
1'900 640.3  -85.0    639.7  -8.3  1.17  -0.89  0.28 
2'000 673.9  -89.5    673.3  -8.8  1.17  -0.89  0.28 
2'100 707.6  -94.0    707.0  -9.2  1.17  -0.89  0.28 
2'200 741.3  -98.5    740.7  -9.7  1.17  -0.89  0.28 
2'300 775.0  -103.0    774.3  -10.1  1.17  -0.89  0.28 
2'400 808.7  -107.0    808.0  -10.5  1.17  -0.89  0.28 
2'500 842.4  -112.0    841.7  -11.0  1.17  -0.89  0.28 
2'600 876.1  -116.0    875.3  -11.4  1.17  -0.89  0.28 
   t  983.34  -34.83    463.63  -2.00  3.15  -2.40  37.57 
   p  <0.001  <0.001    <0.001  0.046  0.002  0.017  <0.001 
 


















































































































































































































































































































Result 1:  Variance of future CO2 emissions 
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Combining (A2) and (A3) establishes the result in equation (12) 
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Result 2:  Generalization of the variance for different volatilities  
I start by restating the equation (17): The variance of   and   for  t c t h t s   0  is  






Var x e i y dy x c h
 
  
35 Suppose that at time s, we’re in month 5 and want to calculate the variance of 
consumption/precipitation in month 8. Using the notation defined in the text that 
, we have that  .  I now split 
up the integral in (17) into four integrals with constant volatility:  
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Next, I split the exponents such that they match with the new upper limits of the integrals and 
move the remainder (a constant) in front:  
(A5)   
min min
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Because the volatilities are constant within each integral, each of them can be solved to  
   
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Multiplying out and some rearranging gives 
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which can be generalized to  
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36 Result 3:  Covariance of x on two different days  
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I split up the second integral into two parts and pull out the constant term:  
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The second term is the expectation of the product of two stochastic processes occurring during 
non-overlapping time periods.  Because a Wiener process is i.i.d., this term drops out.  Using 
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